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THE RULE OF LAW:
A CURRENTLY INCOHERENT IDEA THAT
CAN BE REDEEMED THROUGH VIRTUE
R. George Wright*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The crucial idea of "the rule of law" comes in several varieties, or
conceptions.' One family of traditional conceptions of the rule of law
focuses primarily on procedures, processes, formalities, and decisionmaking structures. 2 Another family of rule of law conceptions places a
greater emphasis on substantive or "positive" rights.3 These two
contending families may or may not be reconcilable.4 More
fundamentally, I argue herein that all of the mainstream understandings
of the rule of law are internally inconsistent. Recognizing this surprising
fact, however, can lead to favorable consequences. The mainstream
ideas of the rule of law are indeed internally inconsistent, and thus
misconceived, but they are not beyond any useful reconstruction. A
genuinely coherent idea of the rule of law can be developed, and at least
* Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of
Law.
1. For the distinction between general concepts and more specific conceptions thereof, see
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 70-72 (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
135-36, 226-27 (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5-6 (1971).
2. See infra Parts H-Il.
3. "Positive" in this sense refers not to rights being written into the law and observed or
enforced, as in the idea of legal positivism, but to rights that require affirmative, costly provision.
For discussion of the former sense of "positive," see, for example, BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE:
THEORY AND CONTEXT ch. 3 (6th ed. 2012). For discussion of the latter sense of "positive," see, for
example, David P. Currie, Positive and Negative ConstitutionalRights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864, 868,
872-80 (1986); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and
Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 1821, 1833-35 (2001); infra Parts H-I11.
4. For background, see W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 167, 184-87 (1956); David Hillel-Ruben, WB. Gallie and Essentially
Contested Concepts, 39 PHIL. PAPERS, 257, 259-61 (2010); Peter M. Shane, The Rule of Law and
the Inevitability of Discretion,36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 21, 21-22 (2013); Jeremy Waldron, Is
the Rule ofLaw An EssentiallyContested Concept (in Florida)?, 21 L. & PHIL. 137, 138-44 (2002).
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approached, in practice. The key point is that the rule of law, in and of
itself, requires more than the currently dominant theories recognize or
admit. The crucial missing element, as I discuss below, is that of the
basic virtues and vices.5
When we think of "law," as in "the rule of law," we ordinarily think
in terms of various sorts of procedural or substantive rules, principles,
structures, policies, doctrines, standards, processes, tests, rights, and so
forth.6 These various elements of the rule of law may or may not have a
general moral dimension, as well.7 A coherent understanding of the rule
of law also, however, inescapably requires specific reference to several
virtues. Briefly put, basic virtues are built into a coherent understanding
of the rule of law. 8 But basic virtues are clearly not reducible to anything
like the typically assumed elements of the rule of law-rules, principles,
policies, rights, and so on. 9
Virtues, thus, are of the essence to the rule of law.' ° This claim is
not merely that a virtuously implemented rule of law tends to be a better
rule of law, or that virtues merely enhance, improve, or stabilize a
preexisting and independent general rule of law. The various basic
virtues are instead intrinsic and essential to the very existence of the rule
of law, and not merely to its creditable execution or implementation."
Moreover, virtues are inherent within the rule of law and not just in its
admirable execution, despite the fact that the relevant virtues cannot be
reduced to anything like rules, principles, policies, rights, or any other
familiar elements of the rule of law.12
As surprising as this result might be, the good news is that if we
understand the rule of law as virtue-impregnated in its very essence, we
should then be able to enhance the quality of our rule of law institutions.
In particular, our attention could then more readily be drawn to

5. See infra Part IV.
6. For one attempt at a distinction among rules, principles, policies, and standards, see
Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14, 22-29 (1967).
7. The necessary role, if any, for moral considerations in a system of law is, in general, the
subject of continuing controversy sparked by H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW ch. IX (1961)
and LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev. ed. 1969). The discussion of basic virtue,
below, does not require that we think of all of the relevant virtues as distinctly moral virtues. See
sources cited infra notes 157, 189.
8. See infra Part IV. For an especially subtle account of the relationship between rules or
principles and virtues at a broader level, see Robert C. Roberts, Virtues and Rules, 51 PHIL. &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 325, 331-33 (1991). For a broader downplaying of rules and principles
in ethics, see generally JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES (2004).

9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra Part HI.
See infra Part 111.See generally FULLER, supra note 7.
See infra Part V.
See Roberts, supranote 8, at 331; infra Part IV.
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enhancing the role of the virtues inherent within, or in the operation of,
the rule of law system, 13 and to specific ways in which the virtues
implicated in the rule of law system can be developed and
strengthened. 14 The distinction between what is intrinsic to the rule of
law, and what is a part of merely the implementation, execution, or
the rule of law is explored a bit further in the concluding
carrying out of
15
Part V below.
To lay the groundwork for explaining and justifying these claims,
though, let us first briefly summarize a few of the more prominent
mainstream understandings of the rule of
classical16 and contemporary"
8
law as an institution.'
II.

SOME HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE IDEA OF

THE RULE OF LAW

Probably no single historical writer has produced a complete and
entirely satisfactory account of the institution of the rule of law.
Collectively, though, the historical writers have jointly arrived at most, if
not all, of what contemporary rule of law theorists would want to say.
Consider the highly selective sampling of views immediately below.
As is frequently the case, Plato provides a helpful start to the
inquiry. In his late dialogue The Laws, Plato writes that "the highest
office in the service of the gods must be allocated to the man who is best
at obeying the established laws."1 9 More pointedly, Plato then continues:
"Such people are usually referred to as 'rulers,' and if I have called them
'servants of the laws' it's.., because I believe that the success or failure
20
of a state hinges on this point more than on anything else.,
Interestingly, Plato had earlier emphasized the role of the classic virtues
in this context throughout The Republic.2'

13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV. This argument does not assume that the proper functioning of the rule of
law is always the highest moral virtue of a legal system; it merely assumes that all else equal, the
proper functioning of the rule of law is a good to be pursued.
15. See infra Part V.
16. See infra Part 1I.
17. See infra Part 11.
18. See infra Part Il1.
19. PLATO, THE LAWS bk. IV, at 174 (Trevor J. Saunders trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1975)
(c. 350 B.C.E.).
20. Id.
21. See generally PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Allan Bloom trans., Basic Books 1991) (c. 370
B.C.E.).
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The basic message of Plato in The Laws was followed by Aristotle
in his own classic work, Politics.22 Aristotle concisely argues that
"[r]ightly constituted laws should be the final sovereign, and personal
rule, whether... by a single person or body of persons, should be
sovereign only in those matters on which the law is unable, owing to the
difficulty of framing general
rules for all contingencies, to make an
23
exact pronouncement.
A largely normative, as opposed to purely descriptive, 24 account of
25
law is later endorsed by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologica.
Aquinas at least cites the argument that human law ought to be
"virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the
country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful, clearly expressed,
[and] framed for no private benefit, but for the common good. 26 Clarity
of the law is specifically cited, "lest by [the law's] obscurity it lead to
misunderstanding., 27 This is one of the continuing "formal"
considerations that are, as we shall see below, commonly thought of by
modem writers as components of the rule of law.28
Almost simultaneously, the Magna Carta of 1215 recognized, as a
matter of positive law, some important elements of the modem rule of
law. 29 Perhaps most centrally, clause thirty-nine addresses, in a limited
way, what we would call due process: "No free man shall be seized or
imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or possessions, ... except by the
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land. ' 30 Six hundred
22. See generally PLATO, supra note 19.
23. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. I, at 127 (R.F. Stalley ed., Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ.
Press rev. ed., 2009) (c. 350 B.C.E.). See generally W. von Leyden, Aristotle and the Concept of
Law, 42 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1967).

24. Thomas Aquinas famously seeks to unite just or natural law principles with (valid)
positive human law by arguing that in some sense, an unjust positive law should not count as
genuine positive law. See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA qu. 95, art. 2 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics rev. ed., 1981) (c. 1274) (referencing Saint
Augustine's philosophy). Commonsensically, though, a positive human law that is inconsistent with
an established custom could still be enforced, and in that sense count as law, as could law that fails
to display some relevant virtue. See, e.g., MARSILIUS OF PADUA, DEFENSOR PACIS ch. X, at 36
(Alan Gewirth trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2001) (1324).
25. See AQUINAS, supra note 24, at qu. 95, art. 2 (referencing Saint Augustine's philosophy).
26. Id. at qu. 95, art. 3 (citing Saint Isidore of Seville and referring to human law as conducive
to human virtue). For Aquinas's understanding of the idea of law in a much broader sense, see id. at
qu. 90. For Aquinas's discussion on the virtues as habits or traits of character, see id at qu. 55-66.
27. Id. at qu. 95, art. 3. For broad further discussion, see generally JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS:
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (1998).

28. See infra Part II.
29. See generally The Text of Magna Carta, FORDHAM U., www.fordham.edu/halsall/
source/magnacarta.asp (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
30. Id. at cl. 39; see also id. at cl. 40 ("To no one will we sell, to no one deny or delay right or
justice.").
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years later, Justice Joseph Story cited this passage as authority for
procedural due process and trial by jury.3
At a more general level, the Magna Carta then specifies that "[w]e
will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs, or other officials, only men
it well." 32
that know the law of the realm and are minded to keep
Pressing the argument further, Marsilius of Padua concluded a century
later that "no judgment, so far as possible, should be entrusted to the
discretion of the judge, but rather 33it should be determined by law and
pronounced in accordance with it."
Further differentiation of the broad idea of the rule of law-as
supposedly distinct from the "rule of men" 4 -is then worked out by the
seventeenth century political theorist James Harrington.35 Harrington
argues in the following terms:
That law which leaves the least arbitrary power to the judge or
judicatory is the most perfect law. Laws that are the fewest, plainest,
and briefest leave the least arbitrary power to the judge or judicatory
and, being a light to the people, make the most incorrupt government.
Laws that are perplex, intricate, tedious, and voluminous leave the
greatest arbitrary power to the judge or judicatory36and, raining snares
on the people, make the most corrupt government.
In a later and somewhat more "substantive" approach to the rule of
law, William Blackstone sought to combine a concern for liberty, the
conformity of orders and decrees to the rules of equity, and the equal
protection of the laws, "by which the meanest individual is protected
from the insults and oppression of the greatest. 3 7 Some emphasis on the

31. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 932, at 663 (Carolina Academic Press rev. ed., 1987) (1833).
45.
32. The Text ofMagna Carta,supra note 29, at cl.
at 40-42 (citing Aristotle).
33. MARSILIUS OF PADUA, supra note 24 at ch. XI, 38; see also id.
34. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA AND A SYSTEM OF POLITICS 9
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1992) (1656) (referring to "the empire of men and not

of laws"); see JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 137, at 259 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1963) (1690).
35.

HARRINGTON, supra note 34, at 9.

36. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES HARRINGTON:
REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 26 (Charles Blitzer ed., The Liberal Arts Press, Inc. 1955) (1661).
We need not take sides on the question of whether long and complex, or brief and plain, statutes are
more open to manipulation, and to facilitating "the rule of men" as distinct from "the rule of law."
For a brief discussion of Aristotle's influence on Harrington, see James Colton, James Harrington
as Aristotelian, 7 POL. THEORY 371, 374 (1979). For a contemporaneous emphasis on certain kinds
of impartiality, along with a concern for justice, in adjudicating, see 1660: Matthew Hale's 18 Rules
for Judges, DUHAIME'S, http://www.duhaime.org/LawMuseun/LawArticle-1166/1660-matthewhales-18-rules-for-judges.aspx (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
37. Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England: Introduction, THE AVALON
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idea of universal equality before the law appears, as well,
in works of
39
38
later writers such as A.V. Dicey and Leonard Hobhouse.
From even this highly selective historical summary, we see the
basic idea of an attempted distinction between the rule of law and the
rule of persons; some progress in specifying a number of formal,
procedural, or process-based components of the rule of law; and even a
start on conceptions of the rule of law incorporating substantive rights or
other substantive moral values oriented toward the common good.4"
Contemporary understandings of the rule of law, for the most part,
elaborate upon, or add further comprehensiveness and precision to, one
or more of the classic understandings of the rule of law. Below, I
consider the roles of the various virtues mainly in the contemporary,
rather than classical, context.4 '
III.

SOME CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE IDEA OF
THE RULE OF LAW

Contemporary writers have reached no precise consensus on the
meaning and features of the rule of law, whether in largely descriptive or
in normative terms.4 2 While there is, thus, no neutral approach to
contemporary rule of law theories, some approaches can be used to
illustrate the essential, inherently conceptual role of virtue more clearly
than others.43 This is, however, not to suggest any such awareness or
intention on the part of the various theorists concerned.
For our purposes, a brief survey of contemporary rule of law
theories could certainly focus on the popular eight-component approach
of Professor Lon Fuller.44 This is not to privilege Fuller's approach
PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th-century/Blackstoneintro (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).

38. A.V. Dicey famously opposed the rule of law to arbitrariness, to broad discretionary
authority, and to class or personal inequality before the law. See Michael L. Principe, Albert Venn
Dicey and the Principlesof the Rule of Law: Is Justice Blind? A ComparativeAnalysis of the United
States and Great Britain, 22 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 357, 359 (2000) (citing ALBERT V.
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 42 (10th ed. 1961)).

39. See L.T. HOBHOUSE, LIBERALISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 11 (James Meadowcroft ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) (1911) (stating that "the first condition of free government is
government not by the arbitrary determination of the ruler, but by fixed rules of law, to which the
ruler himself is subject"). For a well-known brief treatment of the history of the idea of the rule of
law, see F.A. HAYEK, THE RULE OF LAW 6-17 (1975).
40. See HAYEK, supranote 39, at 17-18; HOBHOUSE, supra note 39, at 11; Richard H. Fallon,
"The Rule of Law" as a Concept in ConstitutionalDiscourse, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 7-9, 55 (1997).
41. SeeinfraPartIl.
42. For a typology of approaches to the rule of law, see Fallon, supra note 40, at 55
(distinguishing historicist, formalist, Ilegal process, and substantive approaches to the idea of the
rule of law). See generally Part HI.
43. See Fallon, supranote 40, at 55.
44. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 33.
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relative to that of others, or to beg relevant questions. Convenience in
exposition is really all that is sought by our initial focus on Fuller's
widely cited account.4 5
Let us consider Professor Fuller's eight requirements of the rule of
law, beginning, for convenience, with Professor Margaret Jane Radin's
exceptionally concise summary of the requirements: "[F]irst, there must
46
be rules; second those rules must be capable of being followed.
Professor Fuller's own account, however, deserves quotation at some
length, on the understanding that Fuller is specifying eight, more or
less, 47 separate elements, the complete absence of any one of which
results not merely in a defective or bad system of law, but in the absence
of a system of law, properly understood.4 8 Thus, there are, as negatively
formulated by Fuller, 49 eight routes to the "end" of failing to make law:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so
that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis. The other routes
are: (2) a failure to publicize, or at least make available to the affected
party, the rules he is expected to observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive
legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but undercuts the
integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the
threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules
understandable; (5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules
that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 50 (7)
45. See, e.g., LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 8 (1988); MATTHEW H.
KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 103 (2007) (referring to "Lon Fuller's famous

exposition of the central elements in the rule of law"); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 206-08
(rev. ed., Belknap Press 1999); N.E. SIMMONDS, LAW AS A MORAL IDEA 54 n.26 (2007) (stating
that Simmonds "take[s] Fuller's eight desiderata for the rule of law as constituting an adequate
(albeit provisional) account of the archetype of law," and then briefly summarizing the eight
criteria); Matthew H. Kramer, On the Moral Status of the Rule of Law, 63 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 65, 65
(2004) (stating that "the rule of law as understood throughout this article is admirably encapsulated
in Fuller's eight principles of legality," and summarizing all eight principles); Andrei Marmor, The
Ideal of the Rule of Law 1 & n.1 (2008), available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/users/amarmor/
documents (endorsing most if not all of Fuller's principles, and citing leading jurisprudence scholars
John Finnis, Neil McCormick, and Joseph Raz as fellow endorsers); Margaret Jane Radin,
Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REv. 781, 784-85 (1989) (paraphrasing and then seeking
to condense Fuller's eight elements); Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 200, 205 (2012); see also Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 167 (7th Cir. 1969) (citing
Fuller's second chapter). For a broader, more general discussion of Fuller's work, see ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 36-40 (1984).
46. Radin, supranote 45, at 785. I set aside the possibility that a rule that is incapable of ever
being followed by anyone might, in a sense, not amount to a genuine rule.
47. But see FULLER, supra note 7, at 39 (providing Fuller's assumption of the distinctness of
the elements).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Whether people genuinely could have obeyed the law when they, in fact, did not is a
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introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot
orient his action by them; and finally, (8) a failure of congruence
51
between the rules announced and their actual administration.
The point of quoting Fuller at length is not to quibble about Fuller's
eight factors, in the sense of any possible overlaps, omissions, undue
inclusions, or of tinkering at the margins of any of the elements on
Fuller's own terms. The basic "virtues as inherent in the rule of law"
argument can be based on Fuller's typologies, or on many others.52
Consider first, though, the general character of Fuller's elements of
the rule of law, perhaps adding one or more distinctly "substantive"
rights into the mix, if one so cares. 3 Consider in particular Fuller's fifth
element of the rule of law, which rejects the enactment-and the
simultaneous
applicability in some given case-of mutually
contradictory rules 4 This element is representative of the largely
procedural character of Fuller's element list.55 Or one might think of the
fifth, or any other element above, variously as a matter of a rule,
principle, broad doctrine, test, standard, right, or in any similar terms,
the merits of the eight elements aside. Our preliminary point is that
while it is indeed typical to think of the rule of law, and its arguable
components, in formulations similar to Fuller's, all such formulations
miss, underplay, or obscure the essentiality of various basic virtues to
the rule of law in itself.
Let us emphasize, though, that Professor Fuller's list is hardly
unique, in this crucial respect, among contemporary theorists of the rule
of law. For the sake of precision, consider, again verbatim, the key
parallel formulation of Professor John Finnis:
A legal system exemplifies the [r]ule of [f]aw to the extent (it is a
matter of degree in respect of each item of the list) that (i) its rules are
prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not in any other way
impossible to comply with; that (iii) its rules are promulgated, (iv)

matter of increasing scientific and philosophical interest, as outlined in R. George Wright, Criminal
Law and Sentencing: What Goes With Free Will?, 5 DREXEL L. REv. 1, 14-15 (2013).
51. FULLER, supra note 7, at 39. Fuller's and Hayek's accounts are known for emphasizing

the "virtue" of the law in promoting autonomous individual choice, but this sort of virtue in, or in
consequence of, the rule of law is not the subject of our interest herein. See infra Part IV.
52.

See infra Part lV.

53. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
54. A subject's simultaneously conforming to two mutually contradictory rules, within the
zone of their contradictoriness, could also be beyond the compliance capacities of affected parties,
and, thus, also a violation of Fuller's sixth element. See supratext accompanying note 50.
55.

Jeremy Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure,NELLcO 6 (Oct. 10,

2010), http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 1235&context-=nyuplltwp.
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clear, and (v) coherent one with another; that (vi) its rules are
sufficiently stable to allow people to be guided by their knowledge of
the rules; that (vii) the making of decrees and orders applicable to
relatively limited situations is guided by rules that are promulgated,
clear, stable, and relatively general; and that (viii) those people who
have authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an official
capacity (a) are accountable for their compliance with rules applicable
to their performance and (b) do actually
administer the law
56
consistently and in accordance with its tenor.
Note, in particular, that Professor Finnis here delineates the rule of
57
law specifically in terms of rules, in various contexts. Now, we can
loosely speak, in a sense, of the "virtues" or favorable moral (and other)
effects of any system, including a system entirely constituted by rules.
We can speak of the virtues of a steam-propulsion system, compared to
some alternative. But, to oversimplify for the moment, a pure system of
some sorts of legal or non-legal rules would not, simply as rules,
inherently incorporate basic virtues (or vices) as we typically describe
them. 58 So much the worse, I shall argue, for typical understandings of
the rule of law that ignore or underplay the essentiality of various basic
virtues to the (in this respect somewhat misleadingly named) rule of
law itself. 9
Similar observations could be made not only of Fuller's and
Finnis's systems, but of the eight "rules" 60 or "sub-rules '61 recently
recognized as constitutive of the rule of law by Lord Bingham.62
Roughly put, Lord Bingham cites accessibility, intelligibility, clarity,
and predictability; 63 limitations on judicial discretion; 64 equality in
application to relevantly similar cases; 65 "adequate protection of
fundamental human rights; '66 the timely resolution of civil disputes at
appropriate cost; 67 the reasonable and appropriate exercise of executive
56.

JoHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 270-71 (2d ed., 2011).

57. See id. Also, see the Fuller-influenced claim by John Rawls that "the conception of formal
justice, the regular and impartial administration of public rules, becomes the rule of law when
applied to the legal system." RAWLS, supra note 1, at 206 (focusing on the rule of law).
58. See infra Part W.
59. See infra Part IV. Note, though, that we need not claim that a legal culture can aspire to no
higher goal than adhering to the rule of law, even with substantive elements.
60. Lord Bingham, The Rule of Law, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 67, 69 (2007).
61. Id.
62. See id.at 69-82.
63. See id.
at 69-70.
64. See id.
at 72.
65. See id.
at 73.
66. Id. at 75.
67. See id.
at 77.
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and administrative power, subject to judicial review; 68 fairness and
openness of adjudicative procedures; 69 and, finally, compliance with
relevant obligations under international law. 70 Here again, the emphasis,
even regarding substantive rights,7' is on something like the nature of
legal processes and on legal products or outcomes, 72 apart from what we
would normally think of as broad genuine virtues, transplanted into a
legal or adjudicative context.73
The distinguished contemporary legal theorist Joseph Raz offers, as
well, eight components of the rule of law,74 in this instance with less
emphasis on substantive rights than those presented immediately above
by Lord Bingham.7 5 In particular, Professor Raz cites the "principles 76
of prospectivity, openness, and clarity; 77 the relative stability of the
laws; 78 formulating particularized orders through "open, stable, clear,
and general rules; ' 79 judicial independence; 80 "natural justice', 81 in the
sense of open and fair hearings for the sake of "the correct application of
the law;"' 82 broad but otherwise limited judicial review; 83 realistic
accessibility of the courts in terms of money and time; 84 and limits on
police and prosecutorial discretion.85 In this listing, as well, the roles of
rules, principles, policies, processes, procedures, rights, and the like, are,
again, overwhelmingly prominent, if not utterly exhaustive. The
inherent, conceptually essential role of various virtues in constituting the
rule of law itself is, again, left unacknowledged, on this and other
influential contemporary theories of the rule of law. 86 Crucially, though,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

See id. at 78.
See id. at 80.
Seeid. at81-82.
See supra text accompanying note 53.
See supra text accompanying notes 50-57.
See infra Part IV.

74.

See JOSEPH RAZ, THE RULE OF LAW AND ITS VIRTUE, IN LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW

7-11 (Robert L. Cunningham ed., 1979).
75. Seeid.at7-11.
76. Id. at 7.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 7-8.
79. Id. at 8. Note, yet again, the explicit recourse to rules in particular.
80. See id. at 10.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 10-11.
85. See id. at 11. Note that Professor Raz claims neither the comprehensiveness nor the selfevidence, without elaboration, of his list. See id.
86. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 4, 6-7, 11-12 (2001)
(emphasizing, for example, "fidelity to rules" and "principled predictability" as crucially distinct
from the embodied decision-makers);
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the relevant virtues cannot be reduced to any combination of the rules,
principles, policies, processes, procedures, rights, etc., upon which
contemporary theorists focus in describing the rule of law.87 Acting with
prudence or practical wisdom will often require much more than
CONTRIBUTION TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 449 (William Rehg trans.,

1996) ("[T]here is a conceptual or internal relation, and not simply a historically contingent
association, between the rule of law and democracy."); F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF
LIBERTY 149 (1960) ("[A] general rule that everybody obeys, unlike a command proper, does not
necessarily presuppose a person who issued it. It also differs from a command by its generality and
abstractness."); F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: RULES AND ORDER 55 (1973); F.A.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM: A CLASSIC WARNING AGAINST THE DANGERS TO FREEDOM

INHERENT IN SOCIAL PLANNING 112-13 (1944) (focusing on pre-existing, announced, fixed, more
or less general rules amounting to data points for individual planning); DAVID LYONS, ETHICS AND
THE RULE OF LAW 199 (1984) ("An official who is charged with applying the criminal law should
generally be preoccupied with fidelity to its rules and should not attempt to deal with cases by
seeking to serve the values that the rules are designed to serve."); Frederick Schauer, Rules and the
Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 645, 648-50 (1991) (distinguishing rule-based decisionmaking; particularistic decision-making; and particularistic decision-making actually guided by
general rules); Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 44 (2008)
(relating the idea of law itself to that of the rule of law and stating that "systematicity is associated
with the Rule-of-Law requirement of consistency or integrity; ... the existence of general norms is
associated with the Rule-of-Law requirements of generality, publicity, and stability; and.., the
existence of... courts is associated with the Rule-of-Law requirement of procedural due process");
see also id at 5 (the rule of law as opposing arbitrariness, oppressiveness, or short-circuiting of
legal norms and procedures). For commentary on F.A. Hayek's discussion of rules as data points,
see, for example, Todd Zywicki, Economic Uncertainty, the Courts and the Rule of Law, 35 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 196-97 (2012). Of particular interest is the discussion generated by Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989). Justice Scalia argues
that judicial totality of the circumstances tests tend, more than rules, to undermine uniformity,
predictability, and certainty in the law, with worsening consequences as regulations proliferate and
are increasingly used to punish opponents. See id. at 1179. Scalia recognizes that totality of the
circumstances tests and balancing tests are sometimes unavoidable. See id. at 1186-87. He wishes,
rather, to increase the percentage of legal determinations reflecting some general rule. See id
Professor Lawrence Solum has responded valuably to Justice Scalia's arguments. See generally
Lawrence B. Solum, A Law of Rules: A Critiqueand Reconstruction of Justice Scalia 's View of the
Rule of Law (2002), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-303575. Professor Solum
recognizes that "the rule-of-law values of publicity, certainty, uniformity, and predictability of the
law are very important values." Id. at 22. Solum argues, however, that "ad hoc balancing tests may
actually provide more constraint than general rules." Id. at 8. This reflects the possibility that a more
general rule may "also be more ambiguous and hence.., less constraining and predictable in its
application." Id. at 22. Of course, certainty and predictability in the law may be of negative rule of
law value when they exist for the wrong reasons. The utter predictability of a court, for example,
that always rules for favored groups and against disfavored groups, regardless of the facts or the
law, would overall reflect the undermining, rather than the flourishing, of the rule of law. In
addition to the problem of ambiguity noted by Professor Solum, general rules may also lose
predictability value to the extent that the general rules in question are vague. See Shane, supra note
4, at 23 (discussing frequent vagueness in the law). More dramatically, Timothy Endicott has argued
that "[n]ot every law need be vague, but legal systems necessarily have vague laws. So we can go so
far as to say that vagueness is an essential feature of law .... The rule of law entails both the
presence and absence of arbitrary government." Timothy A.O. Endicott, The Impossibility of the
Rule of Law, 19 Ox. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1999).
87. See supra PartllI.
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applying some rule or principle, etc., to a given case. Selecting from
among applicable rules or policies may call for practical wisdom, and
the rule of law, coherently understood, requires concepts of virtue.
Not surprisingly, the same lack of acknowledgment of the essential
role of virtues 88 is a feature not only of contemporary theoretical work,
but of international organizational documents, 89 as well as of the work of
prominent non-governmental organizations. 90 Even less surprising, then,
is a similar lack of acknowledgement in the actual judicial cases.
Any number of case opinions refer explicitly, even if briefly, to the
idea of the rule of law. Among the most memorable, certainly, would be
the classic Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.9' Jacksonville's
colorfully drafted vagrancy ordinance provided for the arrest and
conviction of anyone meeting the following description:
rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or
plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places
where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work

88. Again, anyone is free to call any desired quality of the rule of law, such as prospectivity, a
"virtue" of the rule of law. My use of the term "virtue" will, however, not be so broad as to include
every quality desired of the rule of law, or essential to the rule of law, including prospectivity.
89. See, e.g., G.A. RES. 67/1, U.N., 67TH SESS., U.N. DOC. A/RES/67/1 (Nov. 30, 2012)
(seeking to define the rule of law, at the national and international level, and the rule of law's
relation to human rights, equality, democracy, and economic growth); U.N. Secretary-General,
Delivering Justice: Programme of Action to Strenghten the Rule of Law at the National and
International Levels, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/66/749 (Mar. 16, 2012) (discussing the rule of law as a
"principle of governance" consistent with "international human rights").
WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT,
What is the Rule of Law?,
90. See, e.g.,
http://worldjusticeproject.org/what-rule-law (last visited Sept. 2, 2015); see also Diarmuid F.
O'Scannlain, The Rule of Law and the JudicialFunction in the World Today, 89 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 1383, 1387 (2014) (discussing the World Justice Project). The World Justice Project has
worked in particular on the many complications of attempting to "measure" the rule of law. See
generally Juan C. Botero & Alejandro Ponce, Measuring the Rule of Law (The World Justice
Project, WPS No. 001, 2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-=1966257 (discussing the World
Justice Project and focusing on nine dimensions of the rule of law). For a discussion pursuing
similar questions, see also Tom Ginsburg, Pitfalls of Measuring the Rule of Law, 3 HAGUE J. RULE
L. 269, 275 (2011); Daniel B. Rodriguez et al., The Rule of Law Unplugged, 59 EMORY L.J. 1455,
1471-72 (2010); Stefan Voigt, How to Measure the Rule of Law, 65 KYKLOS 262, 268-76 (2012).
91. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
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but habitually living
92
minor children ....

upon

the

earnings

of their wives

or

The Supreme Court declared the ordinance void for vagueness-an
offense against due process93-and held that the ordinance "encourages
arbitrary and erratic 94 arrests and convictions" 95 and confers "unfettered
discretion" on the police.96
The PapachristouCourt's explicit discussion of the rule of law was
quite brief.97 But the ordinance's vagueness, lack of notice of the scope
of its prohibitions, and the manipulability of its enforcement possibilities
moved the Court to write in "rule of law" terms. 98 Specifically, the Court
declared that "[1]iving under a rule of law entails various suppositions,
one of which is that 'all persons are entitled to be informed as to what
the State commands or forbids."' 99
The Court, thus, does not attempt in Papachristouto inventory all
of the elements of the rule of law.100 But we can fairly point out that the
Court's discussion of the rule of law may reasonably be read as referring
to rules, principles, policies, norms, events, and states of affairs, as well
as to rights-but not to anything remotely akin to a familiar basic
virtue. 1°t More importantly, other cases referring explicitly to
the rule of law, in its various other dimensions, are similarly
oblivious. 10 2 Overlooking the virtues in characterizing the
92. Id.atl56n.1.
93. Id. at 162; see also Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (discussing
the concept of vagueness).
94. Here, as on other occasions, the Court objects to vague language as enabling erratic,
unpredictable, or random enforcement practices where they also note, or might have noted, the
potential for quite predictable and systematically unequal enforcement with regard to particular
disfavored groups. See Papachristou,405 U.S. at 170-71; Desertrain v. Los Angeles, 754 F.3d
1147, 1157 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Papachristou,405 U.S. at 170-71).
95. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 162.
96. Id. at 168.
97. See idat 162.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)). The Papachristou"rule
of law" language is, in turn, quoted in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317
(2012); United States v. Caseer,399 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2005); and Miranda v. Southern Pacific
TransportationCo., 710 F.2d 516, 525, 527 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
100. SeePapachristou,405 U.S. at 162, 171.
101. See infra Part IV. As we shall see, "justice" is classically thought of as one of the basic or
cardinal virtues, and virtually every case opinion, whatever its nature, can be said to seek an
outcome in accordance with justice. But, justice as a classic cardinal virtue and justice as the
outcome to be pursued by a court are clearly not defined in the same way. See infra Part IV, Thus, a
judicial opinion seeking the legally right or just outcome does not necessarily seek or honor justice
in the sense of the classic virtue of character.
102. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000).
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rule of law is, thus, endemic
to the case law, as well as to the broader
03
theoretical discussions. 1
Merely as a further example drawn from the cases, consider the
Court's discussion of the rule of law in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products,10 4 in which the Court considers faimess, 10 5 the "opportunity to
know what the law is, '10 6 the opportunity "to conform [one's]
conduct"'0 7 to the law, the importance of "settled expectations, ' ' and
the related value of giving people appropriate "confidence about the
legal consequences of their actions."' 1 9 The cases also discuss the
principle of "treating like cases alike,"' I' uniformity in applying the
law,' the value of expeditious resolution of disputes and avoidance of
delay,' 12 the "public
performance of the judicial function," ' 1 3 and "an
14
bar."'
independent
It is, in a way, understandable that we think of the various elements
of the rule of law as matters of rules, principles, policies, norms,
procedures, decision-making structures, processes, doctrines, standards,
tests, and perhaps substantive rights. But, as I shall now suggest, the rule
of law in its very essence calls upon a distinct category and dimensionthat of virtue, and of several distinct virtues in particular, beginning with
the crucial virtue of practical wisdom." 5
IV. PRACTICAL WISDOM, SOME ALLIED VIRTUES,
AND THE RULE OF LAW

If we happen to think of the virtue of practical wisdom, prudence,
or the Aristotelian conception of phronesis largely in terms of the
exercise of discretion, it is not difficult to view practical wisdom,
103. See RAZ,supra note 74, at 11. See generally In re Phenylpropanolamine Prods. Liab.
Litig., 460 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2006).
104. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
105. Id. at 265.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Getsy v. Strickland, 577 F.3d 320, 333 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting Aristotle); Getsy v. Strickland, 495 F.3d 285, 314, 324
(6th Cir. 2007) (en bane) (Merritt, J., dissenting) (quoting Aristotle). But cf Peter Westen, The
Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537, 542, 560, 579-80 (1982) (discussing the idea of
equality as either empty or superfluous and confusing).
111. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000).
112. See, e.g., In re Phynylpropanolamine Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1227 (9th Cir.
2006).
113. Todd v. Daewon Am., Inc., 2014 WL 2608454 at *2 (M.D. Ala. June 11, 2014).
114. United States v. Reid, 214 F. Supp. 2d 84, 96 (D. Mass. 2002).
115. See infra Part IV.
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understood as discretion, as separable from, if not opposed to, the rule of
law. 1 6 Arguably, the well-known rule of law theorist Friedrich Hayek
adopts this course with particular clarity. 17
But, what if we focus specifically on fundamental rule of law
elements, such as equality, in the sense of treating relevantly similar
cases alike and relevantly dissimilar cases not-alike?" 8 Or on making a
complex attempt at regulation appropriately understandable, at least to
the primarily affected members of the public? 19 Or on making the lawperhaps with regard to traffic safety and speed limits, alcohol, or
sexuality-performable by the public? 120 Or on some degree of stability
and predictability in the law, in the context of optimally protecting one
or more substantive rights?' 2' Or on avoiding abusive, if not necessarily
all, retroactive legislation or adjudication? 22 Or on carrying out complex
123
legislative programs in ways consistent with their purported purposes?
Or on ensuring that some particular law, perhaps desirable on its face,
does not unduly undermine a separate law or regulatory program? 124 Or
on avoiding changes in a law or regulatory program that would count as
unduly or excessively frequent? 25 Or on making law at all in a rapidly
evolving and poorly understood subject area, 126 or contrary to the values
of simplicity, understandability, and compliance? 127 Or on avoiding
undue delay in resolving legal issues,
given the value of accuracy and
128
fairness in resolving such issues?
A moment's reflection on each of these fundamental dimensions of
the rule of law, as widely understood, leads to a crucial conclusion: the
specific virtue of practical wisdom-setting aside for the moment all

116. See Eugene F. Miller, Prudence and the Rule of Law, 25 AM. J. JuRIs. 181, 181-82
(1979).
117. Seeid at 182.
118. See supra notes 57, 110 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's fourth criterion).
120. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's sixth and seventh criteria).
121. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's seventh criterion in the context of
any substantive (human) right one wishes to build into the idea of the rule of law).
122. See, e.g., supratext accompanying note 51 (Fuller's third criterion). This is not to suggest
that all retroactive legislation is either unpredictable or unjustifiable.
123. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's eighth criterion). Discerning
legislative purposes may require some degree of virtues such as practical wisdom.
124. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's fifth criterion). Noticing aggregate
effects of separately harmless statutes may also require a degree of practical wisdom.
125. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's seventh criterion, in a distinct
respect).
126. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's first criterion).
127. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's fourth, fifth, and sixth criteria).
128. See supratext accompanying notes 69, 86, 110.
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other potentially relevant virtues-is deeply implicated in nearly all of
the elements of the rule of law.
Practical wisdom, crucially, is a part not only of implementing a
well-established and independent rule of law-of executing properly a
pre-existing rule of law 129-- but of the very idea of the rule of law
itself.130 It is without a doubt that we want the rule of law to operate well
in practice, all else being equal, and practical wisdom and other virtues
are a part of this. But, as we work through most, if not all, of the rule of
law elements, such as treating relevantly similar cases alike, we see that
discerning what counts as a relevant similarity-a part of the element
itself-calls for at least some minimal degree of practical wisdom,
among other virtues. 131 With no practical wisdom, or other virtue if we
set aside practical wisdom, what informs our good faith judgment as to
what counts as a genuinely relevant similarity or dissimilarity?
There is of course no guarantee that what we think to be practically
wise will actually turn out to be practically wise, on anyone's standards.
And, thus, there is no guarantee that our attempts to distinguish relevant
from irrelevant considerations will succeed. But, we are not guaranteed
the rule of law merely by desiring it. The rule of law may well be a
matter of degree, so the occasional, or even frequent, lack of complete
virtue need not be fatal to the rule of law, overall or in any particular
respect. 132 But this does not excise the virtue of practical wisdom from
the discerning of relevant and irrelevant similarities.
We shall not tediously work through the virtue of practical wisdom
as essential to various other elements of the rule of law, one by one.
Practical wisdom is essential to judgments as to a proper balance of
stability and change in the law, 133 to judgments that discern and preserve
harmony of purposes in and among the laws, to judgments as to abusive
129. See Claudio Michelon, PracticalWisdom in Legal Decision-Making 2 (U. of Edinburgh
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 2010/13), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1585929 (2010)
(stating that "legal decision-making by public officials... can only be carried out appropriately if
those officials possess certain virtues"). It is possible to argue that a legal system does not exist at
all unless it is carried into execution or implemented sufficiently well. The rule of law may come in
degrees. See infra note 135. But, this does not show that a rule of law system does not exist at all if
there are, say, unintended and unsystematic blunders in executing the rule of law. For further
discussion of the virtue of practical wisdom and other virtues in the context of applying the rule of
law, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 125-26 (2004);

and Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 201 (2003).

130. Solum, supra note 129, at 125-26.
131. Michelon, supranote 129, at 22-23.
132. See, e.g., supranote 57 and accompanying text.
133. Professor Joseph Raz holds that what he calls the principle of required stability in the rule
of law "cannot be usefully subjected to complete legal regulation. It is largely a matter for wise
governmental policy." RAZ, supra note 74, at 8.
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retroactivity, and so on.134 My thesis as to the essentiality of virtue to the
rule of law is upheld even if only one virtue is essential to only one
necessary element of the rule of law. We also need not link the virtues
directly to all of the various elements of the rule of law. But, it is closer
to the truth to think of one or more virtues as linked to all of the
elements of the rule of law than to none of them.
The status and role of practical wisdom in the rule of law should be
generally clear on the basis of mainstream understandings of what the
virtue of practical wisdom amounts to. But, it might be helpful at this
point briefly to refer to classical and modem accounts of this particular
virtue. Thus, for Aristotle, practical wisdom, or excellence in
deliberation, 135 combines "scientific knowledge of the universal with the
sort of experienced eye that enables [the practically wise person] to
apply it effectively in particular cases, ,,136 a quality we might call
"astuteness. 13 7 Practical wisdom requires correctness of desire, 38 which
should encompass "the common good of the multitude;"' 139 correctness
of the calculation or
of one's beliefs and assertions; 140 and "correctness
141 on which such assertions rely. 142
deliberation"
Importantly, the capacities relevant to practical wisdom can be
developed to greater or lesser degrees.143 Thus, "[t]he wise person grasps
the right reasons and values at the appropriate time and changes her
perspective accordingly."' 44 But, practical wisdom is manifested not
only in thought, but in decision and action. 145 Most importantly for our
purposes, we should not expect practical wisdom to be reducible to some
formula, rule, principle, or policy, or combination thereof. Practical
wisdom is, instead, complex, 146 multidimensional, 147 partly contextual or
134. Id.
135. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, at § 5 (W.D. Ross. Trans., digireads.com
2005) (c. 350 B.C.E.); SARAH BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE 242 (1991).
136. C.D.C. REEVE, ACTION, CONTEMPLATION, AND HAPPINESS: AN ESSAY ON ARISTOTLE

150 (2012).
137. BROADIE, supranote 135, at 242.
138. See REEVE, supranote 136, at 131.
139. See AQUINAS, supra note 24, at qu. 47, art. 10 (providing the Aristotle-influenced
account); see also Katherine J. Bangen, et al., Defining and Assessing Wisdom: A Review of the
Literature,21 AM. J. GERIATRIC PSYCHIATRY 1254, 1263 (2013).

140. See REEVE, supranote 136, at 131.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143.

See Valerie Tiberius, Wisdom andPerspective, 102 J. PHIL. 163, 174-75 (2005).

144. Id. at 175.
145. See Bangen, supranote 139, at 1263.
146.

See id

147. See id.; Jeffrey A. Greene & Scott C. Brown, The Wisdom Development Scale: Further
Validity Investigations, 68 INT'L J. AGING & HUM. DEV. 289, 292 (2009) (citing the interrelated
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148 and, therefore
situational, and holistic;
it is somehow greater than the
49
1
inputs.
sum of its
Practical wisdom does in fact seem to be the single virtue most
central to the elements of the rule of law, but a case can be made for
other virtues, as well. The cardinal virtues, beyond practical wisdom, for
example, are often taken to include fortitude or courage, temperance or
appropriate self-restraint, and justice in the sense of a sustained
disposition to afford to other persons that which is due and
appropriate. 15° Broader surveys of basic virtues have added the ideas of
humanity' 5 ' and of transcendence. 5 2 Of course,
somewhat different lists
53
and typologies of basic virtues are possible.
If legislators and judges acknowledge the importance of treating
like cases alike and relevantly dissimilar cases in some other way, are
any virtues other than practical wisdom then required? 154 It clearly
seems so, even though the essentiality of other virtues in large measure
may be conspicuous only in dramatic or unusual contexts, or only after
prolonged reflection. Consider, for example, judges who balance legal
stability' with substantive rights 156 in a context in which highly vocal
and deeply emotional popular resentment of the judge's decision is
assured. 157 In such cases, at least, treating like cases alike may well

dimensions of "Self-Knowledge, Understanding of Others, Judgment, Life Knowledge, Life Skills,
and Willingness to Learn" and discussing judgment as involving "perception and discernment");
Richard Hawley Trowbridge, Waiting for Sophia: 30 Years of Conceptualizing Wisdom in
Empirical Psychology, 8 RES. HUM. DEV. 149, 150 (2011) (citing the dimensions of "selfknowledge, self-integration, nonattachment, self-transcendence, and compassion, as well as a deeper

understanding of life" and seeking to integrate practical and theoretical wisdom).
148. See Bangen, supra note 139, at 1263; see also supra note 8.
149. See Bangen, supranote 139, at 1263; see also Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue (last visited Sept. 2, 2015)

(discussing even rule-oriented moral theorists as recognizing the independent importance of
practical wisdom).
150.

See, e.g., PAUL BLOOMFIELD, THE VIRTUES OF HAPPINESS: A THEORY OF THE GOOD LIFE

175-76 (2014) (seeking to briefly define the four cardinal virtues). See generally JOSEF PIEPER, THE
FOUR CARDINAL VIRTUES: PRUDENCE, JUSTICE, FORTITUDE, TEMPERANCE (Richard Winston et al.

trans., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1966).
151.

See CHRISTOPHER PETERSON & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, CHARACTER STRENGTHS AND

VIRTUES: A HANDBOOK AND CLASSIFICATION 36-38 (2004).
152. See id. at 36, 38-39; Trowbridge, supra note 147, at 150-54.
153.

See, e.g., ROBERT C. ROBERTS & W. JAY WOOD, INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES: AN ESSAY IN

REGULATIVE EPISTEMOLOGY 219-21, 236-37, 257-58, 286-92 (2007) (focusing on appropriate
cautiousness, humility, autonomy, and generosity, beyond the four traditional cardinal virtues).
154. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. For a useful overview, see TAMANAHA, supra
note 129, at 102-13.
157. See TAMANAHA, supranote 129, at 102-03; see also Scalia, supra note 86, at 1180.
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require a special degree of the basic virtue of courage, 158 in the sense of
braving "what is generally supreme in a democracy: the popular will."' 5 9
Or consider the rule of law imperative to treat like cases alike in
contexts of technical complexity and various other uncertainties. Here, it
seems, the elements of the rule of law in themselves require a category
161
60
and the vice of arrogance.
encompassing the virtue of humility
Humility, it has been said, "is the extreme awareness of the limits of all
virtue and of one's own limits as well. This discretion is the mark... of
perfect lucidity . ,162
The argument for the essentiality of the virtues, thus, does not rely
on the classic virtue of justice as a virtue of persons, as defined from the
time of Plato. 163 We are today more used to speaking of justice as an
outcome, or even as a process, than as a virtue of persons. But, it would
certainly be possible to link justice as the virtuous disposition to give to
everyone what is their due 164 to one or more rule of law elements,
including certainly that of routinely treating like cases alike, and
not-alike, 165 or
correspondingly
dissimilar cases
relevantly
accommodating substantive rights.' 66 Such an argument regarding
justice might indeed seem too easy to be meaningful. The personal virtue
of justice may be too hard to distinguish from the just outcome or the
process of treating like cases alike, an element of the rule of law.
Though it might seem that I was thereby simply defining the rule of law
in terms of a virtue, I instead set aside the argument for the virtue of
justice in particular as potentially confusing and certainly unnecessary to
my basic argument.
Let us take it as established, then, that one or more basic virtues are
inescapably inherent in the very idea of the rule of law. 167 Thinking of
the idea of the rule of law, in itself, in terms solely of rules, principles,
158. See Scalia, supranote 86 at 1180.
159. Id. In the extreme case, consider the predictable and sustained hostile reactions to treating
like cases alike in a succession of basic civil rights cases. See generally JACK BASS, TAMING THE
STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FIGHT OVER

CIVIL RIGHTS 207-18 (2003); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Equal Justice Under Law: The
JurisprudentialLegacy of JudgeFrank M Johnson, Jr., 109 YALE L.J. 1237, 1239-40 (2000).
160.

See, e.g., ANDRE COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES: THE

USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 140-48 (Catherine Temerson trans., 2001) (1996).
161. See Valerie Tiberius & John D. Walker, Arrogance,35 AM. PHIL. Q. 379, 382 (1998).
162.

COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 160, at 140.

163. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 135, at bk. I, § 5; Michael Slote, Justice as a Virtue, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice-virtue (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
See generally PLATO, supra note 21.
164.

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 135, at bk. V.

165.
166.
167.

See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 124, 157 and accompanying text.
See Fallon, supra note 40, at 56.
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policies, standards, tests, processes, structures, rights, and so on will,
thus, not suffice. But, there are no obvious logical barriers to revising
our understanding of the rule of law in this regard. Thinking as well of
the roles, actual and possible, of the basic virtues does not require us to
pay some substantial price in public policy terms, including in the justice
of legal outcomes.
In fact, it is entirely plausible that thinking of the rule of law more
distinctly in terms of virtues could have beneficial effects on the rule of
law's various processes and outcomes, at every stage thereof. Think of
the rule of law in practice, in our time and place. Consider the making of
statutes, the conduct of trials, the administration and enforcement of the
law, or even Supreme Court adjudications. Can we say that the rule of
law in those contexts, manifests, in particular, no significant
motivational or cognitive biases, or biases of belief, decision-making, or
behavior? 68 That seems unlikely. Could not a reflective, wellconsidered, virtue-guided approach, among other approaches,
meaningfully address at least some of those biases?
Consider in particular some systematic biases potentially
manifested by legal systems under a rule of law. The Nobel Prizewinning behavioral psychologist Daniel Kahneman has discussed biases,
such as: the neglect of quantity in emotional contexts; 169 political
preferences as determining the persuasiveness of arguments;1 70 the
arbitrary "anchoring" of judgments and behavior by some environmental
cue; 171 judgments as biased by the novelty, poignancy, and the
psychological "availability" of some data; 172 biases in favor of cognitive
consonance or the sheer tidiness and simplicity of overall belief; 73 the
tendency to either overweight or to ignore relatively small risks; 174 the
tendency to ignore or undervalue the representativeness, or the
underlying background likeliness or unlikeliness, of some
explanation; 175 the tendency to find the interesting, vivid, or stereotypic
conjunction of two separate qualities to somehow be more likely than
either one of the two events by itself; 176 the tendency to see causal
168. For an extensive listing, as opposed to an authoritative analysis, of a large
number of potentially relevant cognitive biases, see List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of cognitive-biases (last visited Sept. 2, 2015).
169.

See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 92-93 (2011).

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See id.at103.
See id.at 125-26.
See id.at 138-39.
See id.at 139-40.
See id. at 143-44.
See id. at 151.
See id.at158.
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relationships where there are really only random fluctuations; 7 7 the
adverse effects of "groupthink" and a sustaining community of support
thereof; 78 "planning" biases toward unduly low cost estimates and
unduly high predictions of use;17 9 a related broader bias toward unduly
optimistic predictions; 180 and the difficulty in seeing the flaws
once it has been personally adopted and
and limits of a theory
181
(successfully) used.

Each of these biases is certainly found outside the operation of the
law, but it is also difficult to believe that any such bias is absent from
familiar legislative, administrative, and adjudicative institutions,
operating under the rubric of the rule of law. The courts have repeatedly
cited Professor Kahneman's work, and the various biases as manifested
in various legal and non-legal contexts. 182 And beyond that of Professor
Kahneman specifically, scholarly treatments of cognitive biases,
applicable to rule of
fallibilities, limits, and vices generally seem no less
183
law actors than to private sector decision-makers.

177. See id. at 175-76; see also NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS: THE
HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (2d ed., 2005).
178. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 169, at 217; see also IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF
GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 2-6

(1972); Paul Hart, Irving L. Janis' Victims ofGroupthink, 12 POL. PSYCHOL. 247,251 (1991).
179. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 169, at 249-51.
180. Seeid. at 255-56.
181. Seeid. at276-77.
182. See, e.g., Carmody v. Bd. of Trs., 747 F.3d 470, 475 (7th Cir. 2014) (discussing how
multiple biases are conceivably at work in a state university employment decision, suggesting the
superiority of a pre-termination rather than a post-termination hearing for due process value);
United States v. Ingram, 721 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing the possibility that "anchors"
and anchoring effects might affect judicial sentencing outcomes); Grant v. Trammell, 727 F.3d
1006, 1026 (10th Cir. 2013) (discussing the possible relevance of the "conjunction fallacy" in
connection with the judicial appellate doctrine of cumulative error); Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 975 F. Supp. 2d 430, 436-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (challenging regulation as arguably
involving a consumer perception "framing effect" in which credit card surcharges are perceived
negatively, but an equivalent cash discount is perceived positively).
183. See, e.g., JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, WHY WE MAKE MISTAKES ch. 10 (2009) (noting the roles
of overconfidence, pride, stubbornness, and the virtue of appropriate humility); Heather Battaly,
Epistemic Self-Indulgence, 41 METAPHILOSOPHY 214, 215 (2010) (discussing the vice of selfindulgence as opposed to the virtue of temperance); Wayne Riggs, Open-Mindedness, 41
METAPHILOSOPHY 172, 185 (2010) (recommending "self-knowledge and self-monitoring" to avoid
or limit the vice of closed-mindedness); Ilan Yaniv & Shoham Choshen-Hillel, Exploiting the
Wisdom of Others to Make Better Decisions: Suspending Judgment Reduces Egocentrism and
Increases Accuracy, 25 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 427 (2012) (explaining how "judges" who hold

preconceived opinions as tending to discount unduly the opinions of others and to thus persist in
their own prior opinions). See generally THOMAS GILOVOICH, How WE KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO:
THE FALLIBILITY OF HUMAN REASON IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1991) (noting the relations among

recognizing one's fallibility and the virtues of self-awareness, practical wisdom more generally,
appropriate modesty, and realistic humility).
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Sometimes, the effects of vices and the lack of virtues can be
minimized by largely mechanical techniques and structural
manipulations, as by judicial recusal, the appellate process, or the
separation of powers and checks and balances. 184 Beyond some point,
however, direct attention to reflective solutions, and in particular
to virtues and vices, in the operation of the rule of law takes on
increasing importance. Of course, some possible ways of taking virtues
and vices into account will be intrusive, self-defeating,
counterproductive, coercive, or even tyrannical. But, in more benign
forms, uncoerced attention185 to virtues can promote the rule of law and its
more effective operation.
A partial remedy for official groupthink, for example, is the
cultivation of the virtues of practical wisdom and of certain forms of
courage. 186 Other defects of judgment, throughout the rule of law
process, can be addressed through the virtues of appropriate self-control,
self-discipline or temperance, and through self-monitoring as an aspect
of the virtue of practical wisdom.1 87 A recognition of one's own
fallibility in official decision-making, or of one's relevant limitations in
general, can involve the virtues of self-awareness, modesty, courage, and
appropriate humility. 88 Acting meaningfully on the recognition of one's
vices and limitations may require the virtue of fortitude or courage. 189 In
only slightly different terms, the rule of law can be enhanced in any or
all of its dimensions by the intelligent exercise of the often
underemphasized virtue of self-criticality.' 90
A leading scholar on the exercise of judgment has concluded that
"[g]ood judgment.., is a precarious balancing act.... We need to
cultivate.., self-overhearing, to learn how to eavesdrop on the mental
conversations we have with ourselves as we struggle to strike the right
balance between preserving our existing worldview and rethinking core

184.

See HAMILTON, MADISON & JAY, THE FEDERALIST WITH LETrERS OF "BRUTUS" 51

(Terence Ball ed., 2003).
185.

See, e.g., Riggs, supranote 183, at 185.

186. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 169, at 92-93.
187. Seeid. at153.
188.

See COMTE-SPONVILLE, supranote 160, at 140.

189. See, e.g., N.J.H. Dent, The Value of Courage, 56 PHILOSOPHY 574, 574 (1981).
190. See Richard P. Larrick, Debiasing, in BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND
DECISION MAKING 322 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2007) (noting the logic of "preemptive self-criticism"); Philip E. Tetlock, Intuitive Politicians, Theologians, and Prosecutors:
Exploring the Empirical Implications of Deviant Functionalist Metaphors, in HEURISTICS AND
BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 589-92 (Thomas Gilovich et al. 2002) (listing

and discussing biases and possible modes of decisionmaker accountability, including the exercise of
appropriate self-criticality).
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assumptions."' 91 This perspective, which calls for self-distancing, selfcriticality, practical wisdom, a proper humility, and a certain measure of
courage, nicely illustrates the centrality of the uncoerced cultivation of
the virtues to potential enhancement of the rule of law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Typically, we think that some combination of the ideas of rules,
principles, structures, policies, doctrines, standards, processes, tests, and
rights, would suffice to describe the idea of the rule of law. But as we
have seen, this is not so. Instead, considerations of virtue, including in
particular the virtue of practical wisdom, are inherent in the idea of the
rule of law. Once we recognize this, we then have additional grounds for
exploring the ways in which encouraging the relevant virtues can
promote not just a coherent understanding of the rule of law, but also
rule of law values, and the enhanced operation of the rule of law.
Thinking of the rule of law as inherently virtue-infused, thus,
encourages us to reflect upon the various ways in which the rule of law,
in concept and in operation, could be enhanced by attending, prudently
and non-coercively, to the most relevant virtues (and vices) of character.
Encouragingly, rule of law actors can generally take affirmative steps
with regard to cultivating virtues such as appropriate humility, courage,
including self-criticality, of the crucial virtue of
and the various aspects,
92
practical wisdom.'
A bit more could be said, however, about some of the assumptions
adopted above. One might ask how current understandings of the idea of
the rule of law can possibly be incoherent, given that we do seem to be
operating a sustained rule of law system. The short answer is that
muddling through, more or less uneventfully, over any length of time
does not guarantee genuine underlying coherence. There could, by way
of analogy, be accrediting organizations that legitimize groups founded
on logically defective premises. 193 Less dramatically, but within the field
of the law, for example, we have had a functioning Endangered Species
Act for more than forty years.' 94 Does that mean that the fundamental

191.

PHILIP

E.

TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: How GOOD IS IT? How CAN WE

KNOW? 215

(2005); see also KEITH STANOVICH, RATIONALITY AND THE REFLECTIVE MIND chs. 23 (2010) (discussing the possibility of reflection-driven limitations on the roles of algorithmic
thinking and of cognitive biases).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 192-97.
193. For further discussion, see generally, JORDAN ELLENBERG, How NOT TO BE WRONG: THE
POWER OF MATHEMATICAL THINKING (2014).

194. See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012)).
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idea of a "species," for purposes of the Act, as defined by the Act itself
or elsewhere, simply must be coherent?1 95 Does the operation of any
statute in general mean that the statute must necessarily be contributing
to fulfilling the statute's stated formal purposes? Clearly not. In general,
there can be no guarantee that ongoing institutions are deeply
coherent. 196 And, no such guarantee of deep coherence applies, certainly,
to what we experience and classify under the ongoing rule of law.' 97
A final question one might ask, skeptically, about the rule of law
itself, as supposedly distinct from the rule of law as carried out in
practice: Is there really any viable such distinction? This can be a tricky
matter. Let us in response first think by analogy. We think of beautiful
objects as beautiful, heavy objects as heavy, and blue objects as blue, but
we clearly need not think of the idea of beauty itself as beautiful,
heaviness itself as heavy, or the idea of blueness as blue. An idea or
concept and its manifestations in practice need not share all their
essential elements. This certainly suggests that the idea of the rule of law
itself is not reducible to the rule of law in actual practice.
In the rule of law context, it may help to focus on an element of the
rule of law that does not seem to essentially involve any of the basic
virtues to any interesting degree. Consider in particular the familiar idea
that under the rule of law, any particular law must be somehow duly
promulgated. 198 Commonly, this will involve something like the
availability of the text of some newly adopted statute. 199 Unless we want
to stretch the ideas of the basic virtues, it seems sensible to say that as
important as promulgation of the law may be, mere promulgation of a
law does not essentially or inherently require the exercise, to whatever
degree, of any basic virtue. Virtue is, thus, perhaps not of the essence to
promulgating the law. If someone insists, they could say, for example,
that Judge Frank M. Johnson was in a sense promulgating the civil rights

195. For the statutory definition of "species," which seems to itself incorporate references to
species, sub-species, and to interbreeding, see, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16). For discussion, see Karl
Gleaves et al., The Meaning of "Species" Under the EndangeredSpecies Act, 13 PUB. LAND L.
REv. 25, 27 (1992).
196. Christian Talley, PETA is a Morally Incoherent Organization,VAND. POL. REv. (Jan. 29,
2015,
8:46
PM),
http://www.vanderbiltpoliticalreview.com/peta-is-a-morally-incoherentorganization (illustrating PETA's incoherent stances).
197. See FULLER, supra note 7, at 39 (discussing the challenges that may accompany the rule
of law).
198. See, e.g., AQUINAS, supra note 24, at qu. 90, art. 4; supra text accompanying notes 50-51
(Fuller's second criterion); supra text accompanying note 51 (Fuller's third criterion).
199. But cf AQUINAS, supra note 24 (discussing the promulgation of the natural law).
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law during his tenure, and that
he distinctly manifested the virtue of
20 1
courage or fortitude in doing so.
But, if we do assume that Judge Johnson was promulgating the law
at some pure conceptual level, and not carrying out the rule of law, the
very distinctiveness of his remarkable courage might suggest that
courage and the vices of cowardice or foolhardiness are not intrinsic to
promulgating the law. We tend, more naturally, though, to think that if
Judge Johnson was promulgating the law in any sense, he was just
carrying out, implementing, or putting into practice that element of the
rule of law. On this view, Judge Johnson was more uncontroversially
displaying courage and fortitude merely in carrying out the rule of law.
It, thus, seems that even if the virtue of courage and its
corresponding vices are not essential to the idea of promulgating the law,
courage can still be clearly displayed, at least occasionally, in carrying
out or engaging in the promulgation of the law under particular
circumstances. But, this fact itself actually illustrates the basic
distinction at issue. As we have assumed above, the rule of law, as a
concept, is distinguishable from the rule of law as carried out into
practice, well or ill, under particular circumstances.2 2

200. See supra note 159.
201. See supranote 159.
202. This is not to deny that there can be borderline cases regarding whether the law has been
promulgated at all, apart from cases in which the law has admittedly been promulgated, but perhaps
foolishly, wickedly, or otherwise poorly. In this context, we might wonder about the Emperor
Nero's deliberate practice of posting new edicts in places physically difficult to access. See Scalia,
supranote 86, at 1179.
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